By the class action, Dikranian sought reimbursement from the government for interest paid on students loans by members of the class.  The loan certificate signed by Dikranian with his bank in 1996 provided that he had to begin repaying the principal and paying the interest on the loan upon the expiration of an exemption period.  However, as a result of amendments to the Act respecting financial assistance for students that came into force in 1997 and 1998, Dikranian's bank charged him interest on his loan that, under the loan certificate, was supposed to have been paid by the government. The S.C.Q. and the Québec Court of Appeal (the "Q.C.A.") dismissed the action on the merits, concluding that the 1997 and 1998 legislative amendments covered all student loans contracted before and after the amendments came into force.

By judgment of December 2, 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada (the "S.C.C.") overturned the decisions of the Q.C.A. and the S.C.Q., and maintained the class action. The S.C.C. held that Dikranian had vested rights with respect to the duration of the exemption period for paying interest under his loan certificate, and that in the absence of a clear indication in a statute to the contrary, it is presumed that the legislature did not intend to violate the principle against interference with vested rights.  The S.C.C. returned the case to the S.C.Q. for the purpose of determining "the method for making claims, the amounts owed by Quebec and the payment procedures".

After the S.C.C. rendered its judgment, Dikranian brought a motion to amend the class action which sought to change the form of recovery from individual recovery to collective recovery.  The Attorney General for Quebec (the "A.G.Q.") objected to the amendment sought as, in his view, this would have the effect of modifying the objectives sought by the class action, and that Dikranian was seeking to make new proof that would allow for collective recovery that should have been made before the S.C.Q..  The A.G.Q. contended that the motion to amend went to the jurisdiction of the S.C.Q. to hear new proof (with respect to collective recovery) after a final judgment (that of the S.C.C.) had been rendered.  According to the A.G.Q., the conclusions sought by the motion to amend violated the judicial contract between the parties since they had decided on the method of the trial and the proof to be made, and that collective recovery had never been sought prior to the judgment of the S.C.C..

Judge Journet dismissed Dikranian's motion to amend. He noted that the admissions made by the parties with respect to the questions submitted to the court, and the proof adduced during the hearing constituted a judicial contract that could not be set aside without serious grounds.  He further noted that the decision of the S.C.C. constituted a final judgment on a question of law, and that the motion to amend would require new proof on a fundamental matter that was never announced, nor agreed upon by the parties, as Dikranian had always sought individual recovery.  Finally, Judge Journet noted that an amendment, which under Québec law would have a retroactive effect, could not be granted after a final judgment had been rendered, and that the decision of the S.C.C. required that he accept the case in its current state, and that he could not re-open the proof and hearing in light of an entirely new claim brought by Dikranian.

Davies is involved in some of the largest and most complex class action litigation matters in the country.  Please do not hesitate to call David Stolow (514-841-6567), Mathieu Bouchard (514-841-6479) or Nick Rodrigo (514-841-6548) if you would like further information on this case or to obtain a complete copy of the decision.

The information and comments herein are for the general information of the reader and are not intended as advice or opinions to be relied upon in relation to any particular circumstance. For particular applications of the law to specific situations, the reader should seek professional advice.